		<b>v</b>
1	IN THE UNITED	STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON	
3	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	) Case No. 3:15-CR-0438-JO
4	Plaintiff,	) )
5	v.	) April 17, 2017 )
6	WINSTON SHROUT,	)
7	Defendant.	) Doubles on de Construer
8		) Portland, Oregon
9	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS	
10	(In Chambers Conference)	
11	BEFORE THE HONORABLE ROBERT E. JONES, SENIOR JUDGE	
12		
13		
14	APPEARANCES: FOR THE PLAINTIFF: STU	JART WEXLER
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(Monday, April 17, 2017; 10:30 a.m.) 1 2 3 PROCEEDINGS 4 THE COURT: Put on the record that the defendant, 5 6 Shrout, has waived appearance today. Since we're just going to talk about things --7 8 And thank you for working hard to get this thing 9 together. And your paralegal is always welcome to join us --10 MR. INIGUEZ: Okay. 11 THE COURT: -- and be with you at the trial, at 12 counsel table. MR. INIGUEZ: Thank you, Judge. Yeah. 13 14 THE COURT: Okay. We'll start with the -- I think we'll do the easy stuff first. 15 16 As I mentioned before, I'll conduct the voir dire for 17 both sides. I have the requested questions. I won't ask them in that form, but I'll cover their experiences. 18 The -- the other thing is the preliminary 19 20 instructions -- you've done a great job in agreeing on almost 21 everything except for -- for the -- are you -- tell me what 22 your objections are to the Government's --23 MR. INIGUEZ: So, Judge, they have two instructions. 24 I believe it's two that are disputed. 25 THE COURT: Yeah, well --

MR. INIGUEZ: I'll start with the second one. The one they proposed is -- Government's proposed instruction 2 is on page 3 of their document. Deliberate ignorance.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. INIGUEZ: The problem there, I think, Judge, is that goes directly against the idea of a sincerely held good faith belief. You know, here, this is instructing that the defendant acted knowingly if he was aware of a high probability that a fact was true and deliberately avoided learning the truth.

The problem here, of course, is for the good faith defense under *Cheek*, you can have an irrational, unreasonable misunderstanding or mistake of the law. And I think -- you know, I -- I look for cases in which a *Cheek* instruction is given, as well as deliberate ignorance, and I didn't find any. And I think that's the reason why, is that it seems to be countered to the idea that you can -- I understand the Government, I guess, saying deliberately. But you can be unreasonable, you can be irrational in your belief, as long as it's sincerely held. So I think this just sort of -- if not undercuts it, it directly conflicts with that.

THE COURT: Do you have a suggested alternative?

MR. INIGUEZ: I think this instruction just shouldn't be given.

THE COURT: Okay. Defendant acted knowingly if you

find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was aware of a high probability that a fact was true and deliberately avoided learning the truth.

MR. LANGSTON: And, your Honor, if I may.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. LANGSTON: It may be premature to address this instruction. We included it as one of the possible instructions, and I know your general practice is to give this -- give the instructions to the jury prior to the evidence. We understand, under Ninth Circuit law, we would only be entitled to this depending on what defense is set forth.

However, particularly with the 514 count, we anticipate that it likely will be relevant. But perhaps it's better to table this until the conclusion of the evidence.

THE COURT: I think that's probably true. And I would anticipate saying -- him saying that he truly believed what he was doing was lawful and he did so openly and to all comers. And so you would have to have some evidence that he avoided learning the truth and he was reading the things he wanted to.

But you have some admissions -- so I'll put a big question mark on that. I doubt that I'll give it.

MR. INIGUEZ: Okay, Judge. Because I think it gets a little too metaphysical, I think, for the jury really to be

thinking, okay, this guy honestly, sincerely believed this stuff --

THE COURT: It's metaphysical enough for -- to act intentionally to defraud, and yet willingness becomes an issue for some counts and not others.

We've had an -- another instruction?

MR. INIGUEZ: The other one is the Government's No. 1 instruction.

And this one, Judge, I think we have to look at it in concert with my proposed -- Mr. Shrout's proposed instruction, which is No. 2. This is essentially competing versions of the same instruction.

What I would -- what I would tell you is my instruction -- No. 2 -- I verbatim quoted the Ninth Circuit cases that we're talking about -- or that we're relying on; whereas, the Government is kind of -- what? Using their own language to synopsize, in a way, what the cases are saying. And then I think actually going a little further than the cases would warrant.

For example, their Instruction No. 1, after you list these indicia or hallmarks of -- of what would be, you know, genuine financial instruments, they say:

Such obligations are illegal, regardless of their status as negotiable or nonnegotiable.

Well, that's an overstatement of the cases, I would

say.

We're talking, here, about *Howick* case and the *Salman* case. And in -- in *Howick*, there was a negotiable instrument. It was a currency. In the other case, it was -- that was -- the document was actually marked "nonnegotiable."

What the -- what the courts are saying is that you can't rely on one of these indicia. One indicia won't take it either way. Right? It doesn't win the day for you or -- you have to look at the entire document and see what the indicia of genuineness are.

So although in Salman they did say, "This document, even though it's nonnegotiable that doesn't win the day for the defendant," it's a little too much to say simply that they're illegal regardless of whether they're negotiable or not. It's one factor to consider. And that's why, you know, the paragraph right above talks about those various factors. So I would certainly want that out.

Like I say, I just -- in my instruction, I tried to go with exactly what the court said so that there wasn't an issue here. And so I would ask the Court to instruct on Mr. Shrout's No. 2, rather than the Government's No. 1.

The other problem I have with the Government's instruction is that it then is the intent to defraud, right?

These are supposed to be definitions. And it does define -- it goes on to define intent to defraud. And it seems like they

are adding, maybe, one sentence here on good faith. Whereas I think -- and I have proposed -- a separate instruction that there be a good faith defense to this.

So I don't think it's correct to just toss it out in the -- you know, in these -- in this definitional section. The Government says, simply:

Further, in determining whether he acted with intent to defraud, you may consider whether he had an honest, good faith belief in the authenticity of the documents.

THE COURT: Don't go too fast.

MR. INIGUEZ: Okay. So that sentence there.

And then the -- the next sentence, one who acts with honest intention is not chargeable with fraudulent intent.

I mean, if we were actually looking at this instruction, I would say, well, you know, it's an open issue. It's whether you've charged somebody who has an honest intention. I take issue with the language here.

But I think, just as for the tax charges, we have the instruction on the elements of the offense, and then you have the defense, the *Cheek* instruction.

Here, I agree -- you were the other day noting that willfulness is an element of the *Cheek* defense but good faith is a separate defense to intent to defraud. And I think the parties are in agreement on that.

So what I would propose is the instruction that Judge Simon gave in the *Stephens case*. And that's what I gave you, as well as the Ninth Circuit's opinion in *Molinaro* where that came from. And I think that's just the better form to have the 514 instruction on elements, and then the next good faith defense; just as we're dealing with the tax instruction on the elements for 7203 and then willfulness and the *Cheek* defense right there.

THE COURT: Response?

MR. LANGSTON: Yes, your Honor.

I mean, I think the Ninth Circuit case law -- I'll talk about good faith first -- is fairly clear that once you tell the jury to act with intent to defraud means an act with intent to deceive or cheat, and give that specific intent, you actually don't need a good faith instruction at all.

Now, the Government's included one here, in part because the jury is going to hear the *Cheek* instruction with respect to tax counts. And we think this provides clarification with respect to the different standard for 514.

We think we've clearly stated the law there and provided the defendant -- and laid out the good faith instruction as part of that. I think to add a separate instruction as to good faith muddles the waters more than just as part of the definition of intent to defraud allows the defendant to argue that he has a good faith belief in the

authenticity of the documents and that negates his intent to deceive or cheat.

With respect to the rest of the instruction, the Government did follow the Ninth Circuit cases here. In situations where we did paraphrase, it's simply providing additional context rather than laying out additional language that would confuse the jury.

I actually think the defendant's instruction and the Government's instruction are not too far off. And the Government's instruction No. 1 accurately reflects the case law and provides the jurors with the information --

THE COURT: I don't perceive there's a real dispute, then.

MR. INIGUEZ: I would agree, your Honor, that we're not too far off. I just think it's probably the better practice, if we're using this case law, just to say what the cases say, rather than sort of, you know, elaborating on the paraphrasing --

THE COURT: Judge Simon, and elsewhere, used the term "family"?

MR. INIGUEZ: Right.

THE COURT: What the heck does that mean?

MR. INIGUEZ: Saying family, class of documents.

THE COURT: Huh?

MR. LANGSTON: So I think that is directly from the

case law.

THE COURT: I know it is. But that doesn't make it -- we've said many times, don't use the appellate opinions for your instructions. And I'm not going to use an expression I don't understand.

MR. INIGUEZ: Right.

MR. WEXLER: And if I may, your Honor, just to sort of follow up on what Langston said, the Government specifically included the good faith instruction as it regards to intent to defraud within the definitions related to 514 and not in a separate instruction, so as the jury would understand that this definition is specifically related to 514.

By giving them a good faith instruction separately, it does increase the chance that the jury will misapply that instruction to other statutes that have also been charged.

THE COURT: I'll try my best to keep them separate.

MR. INIGUEZ: Well, Judge, and that's why, in mine, what -- I start off by saying is -- for the good faith instruction. And I think it's a little -- you know, to -- to hide the good faith defense within the definition of intent to defraud, that's, I think, my problem. I think we need to pull it out for the jury, and tell them the good faith is a complete defense to a charge of violating Section 514. That makes it clear. It doesn't -- it doesn't muddy anything because it's making clear that it's for that particular charge only. But I

think to sort of --

THE COURT: As I said, we will make it clear as to which charges we're talking about.

MR. LANGSTON: Judge, I just also did want to highlight one particular difference between the Government's proposed instruction and the defendant's proposed instruction is that at the bottom of the Government's proposed instruction No. 1, fictitious instruments include even bogus instruments --

THE COURT: Will you speak a little more slowly and clearly.

MR. LANGSTON: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Because, you see, this is Amanda LeGore, and she's been with me for over 25 years. And she'll frown at you if you go too fast. And the jury will, too.

MR. LANGSTON: Yes, your Honor.

Include documents that a prudent person might be unlikely to accept as genuine. And I think that is very much an accurate statement of the Ninth Circuit law. We anticipate that the defense in this case may well include something about the fact that because the amounts were for a trillion dollars, no one could accept these as real.

And so we think it's important that the jury be instructed that even if a prudent person might be like -- unlikely to accept them, provided they bear a resemblance to the -- to actual documents and the defendant having an intent

to defraud, that he's still liable under 514.

THE COURT: All right. I think that we will come up with a composite, then.

And I do pre-instruct the jury to a degree, realizing that these are preliminary instructions. And that I will supplement them later. Repeat them and supplement them.

So a lot of times, previously -- well, judges have not even instructed a jury beforehand. And so I want to have them realize what they -- what they have to decide, rather than saying, by the way, after a week, you should have been paying attention to this and this.

So it's a vast improvement for them. The -- I looked over your list of witnesses, and you have nine, which is fine.

Any particular problem with the witnesses that the Government's going to call?

MR. LANGSTON: Your Honor, if I may, one other issue with the jury instructions is defense Instruction No. 6.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. LANGSTON: Defining "void." The Government thinks that instruction is improper.

THE COURT: I don't think it's necessary. Void is void.

MR. INIGUEZ: Judge, here's the reason we've raised it. I'm sure you've looked at these --

THE COURT: Yes, I did.

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MR. INIGUEZ: Each one of them, on their face, says, "Void where prohibited by law." And I think most people might have an understanding -- a general understanding, a lay understanding what "void" means. But I think to give them the legal understanding of that meaning, I think that would help them in determining what this exactly means on its face. THE COURT: Are you claiming that those are -- have legal effect in this case? MR. INIGUEZ: No. I would say that by using the word "void," indicates that they're null. That they're ineffective legally, where prohibited by law. If the Government's theory is correct, that they're prohibited by law, then they are on their face void, of no legal effect. That's what the documents say on their face. I'm just concerned that a juror is not going to understand the legal meaning of the word "void." THE COURT: Well, what is the legal meaning of this? The fact that you're a notary from some Excalibur, or you've been -- it's nonsense. So I'm not going to worry about it. MR. INIGUEZ: Okay. THE COURT: I appreciate the position you're in. MR. INIGUEZ: Yeah. And, obviously, I'm offering the

MR. INIGUEZ: Yeah. And, obviously, I'm offering the instruction. I think it goes to the document, so I would ask that it be instructed. But I hear you.

THE COURT: Yeah. Anyway, I have said what I've said, I wanted to say.

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My question was, did you have any problem with the
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     witnesses that they've listed?
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               MR. INIGUEZ: I don't think so. I am not sure -- the
     initial list was 16, I think.
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               Right, guys?
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               THE COURT: Down to nine.
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               MR. INIGUEZ: So I'm not sure exactly which nine
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    we're talking about now.
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               THE COURT: He gave you a copy of it.
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               MR. INIGUEZ: A new list?
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               MR. WEXLER: Yes. And it's just, for the most part,
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     the custodians that have been excluded. But it will be --
                           We'll --
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               THE COURT:
               THE CLERK: Do you have a copy of this. You can have
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     that.
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              MR. INIGUEZ: (Handed document.) Oh, yeah. Right,
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     right.
                           It looks innocuous.
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               THE COURT:
               Now, I haven't played that DVD. Does that have the
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     statements being made by the defendant?
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               MR. WEXLER: From the defendant's exhibits, your
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    Honor?
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               THE COURT: No, I thought -- I -- excuse me. I just
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    got a DVD.
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               THE LAW CLERK: Right here, Judge. That was from the
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     defendants --
               THE COURT: Oh.
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               MR. INIGUEZ: That was from his website, his YouTube
     channel.
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               THE COURT:
                          What's in it?
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               MR. INIGUEZ: It's him introducing -- it's the first
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     YouTube presentation that he gives. And it's kind of him
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     explaining what it is that he's doing.
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               THE COURT: Do you know what it is? Did you get a
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     copy of it?
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               MR. LANGSTON: Yes, your Honor.
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               THE COURT: Have you played it?
               MR. LANGSTON: We haven't played the DVD itself, but
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     we've been to the YouTube channel and watched it.
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               THE COURT: How long is it?
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               MR. INIGUEZ: 20 minutes.
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               MR. LANGSTON: And the entire thing consists of
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    hearsay.
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               THE COURT: Okay. I'll be looking at it.
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               But back to -- you have a cropped version of the
     defendant making admissions of a party opponent?
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               MR. WEXLER: Yes, your Honor.
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               As we submitted -- I can't remember exactly where we
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     submitted it, but we did list the timestamps during which we're
     going to play the video. So the jury will only see, in total,
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I believe it's seven video clips. They total about 20 minutes. 1 THE COURT: Just give me a brief summary of your 2 3 most-telling admissions that he made. MR. WEXLER: Yes, your Honor. 4 In the videos from -- the video clips from both 5 Orlando and London, the defendant walks a seminar class through 6 7 the creation of a nonnegotiable bill of exchange, which the 8 defendant is charged with filing --9 THE COURT: What does he say? 10 MR. WEXLER: He says he doesn't know what any of the 11 words mean. And, in fact, he says, "Which is pretty cool, 12 because if we don't know what they mean, they don't either." And he's referring to the Government and the banks. 13 That's the essence of it? 14 THE COURT: 15 MR. WEXLER: Yes, your Honor. In another part of the clip, he mentions how he came 16 17 up with the idea of putting a stub on the document because he 18 thought it would make it seem more complete. 19 And so the Government's argument is that he's 20 attempting to make this document appear as legitimate as possible in order to trick someone into actually crediting it. 21 22 So by adding this stuff --23 THE COURT: Is he telling the audience that they 24 should do specific acts?

MR. WEXLER: Yes. He's telling -- you know, with

regards to the sub -- stub, he actually says:

You can do this or you can not do it. We haven't had success with it. I thought it would work. So you -- you can try it.

In regards to the other aspects of the bill of exchange, he does specifically say:

Look, this is where you put your Social Security.

Don't put any dashes. Make sure that's just your straight Social Security number. This is where you put this. This is where you put that.

He walks them completely through the creation of -THE COURT: Is he telling them then you won't have to
file income tax?

MR. WEXLER: In those clips he does not address the filing of income taxes.

And, your Honor, the Government's clips generally do not go to the 7203 counts. They go to the 514 counts. And most particular, Counts 10 and 13, which is the nonnegotiable bill of exchange the defendant sent to the Treasury.

In another, clip -- and I apologize, your Honor. I didn't bring my notes as to the clips, so I'm going off the top of my head.

In another clip in San Antonio, he talks at length to his seminar about the concept of wishful intent and how to get around willful intent. And that if you actually intend to do

something, you should be judged guilty of that act.

In the St. Joseph -- I believe it is -- Missouri, video, he actually tells the seminar that they should juice up the numbers on these documents, and specifically instructs them to lie by saying, "You should put 10 million dollars instead of ten dollars," for --

THE COURT: I remember that part.

MR. WEXLER: And -- because that's what the Treasury is looking for. They're not looking for a 10 or hundred dollar debt.

THE COURT: Okay. This is what I -- are you going to -- who's going to make an opening statement?

MR. LANGSTON: I will, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. What I want you to do is to clearly define in your opening statement the distinction between these two main counts and the elements. I want you to point out, These are the elements you must find for this count, these counts. And these -- these are the elements you must find for these counts.

And so the jury will know in their own mind, and state it precisely where you think good faith is relevant and where it is not.

MR. WEXLER: And, actually, your Honor, I did find my notes as to the other videos, if you would like me to address the other video clips as well, I can.

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THE COURT: Just a moment. Let's just do one at a
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     time.
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               MR. WEXLER: Oh, I apologize, your Honor.
               THE COURT: And he's going to give the opening
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     statement?
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               MR. INIGUEZ: He is, Judge.
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               THE COURT: All right.
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               MR. INIGUEZ: I won't jump there yet, but maybe we
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     can talk about closings when we're further along.
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               THE COURT: Okay. Now, for defense witnesses, is he
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     going to testify then?
               MR. INIGUEZ: He is.
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               THE COURT: And is there anybody else?
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               MR. INIGUEZ: Well, I gave you the list.
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               THE COURT: I didn't see anybody else.
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               MR. INIGUEZ: Oh, no?
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               He listed the agent, the special agent for the I.R.S.
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               THE COURT: Oh, yeah, I did.
               MR. INIGUEZ: He, of course, will be cross-examining.
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     But he would like to call -- call the agent, rather than
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     cross-examine --
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               THE COURT: Whatever.
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               MR. INIGUEZ:
                             Yeah.
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               He listed Mr. Wexler as a witness, and gave the
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               I think he gave a little summary of why.
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THE COURT: Yeah. 1 2 MR. INIGUEZ: And he listed the Attorney General for 3 Oregon, Ms. Rosenblum. And I think --THE COURT: I didn't see that. 4 5 MR. INIGUEZ: Yeah, yeah. So he listed those -those three --6 7 THE COURT: I would need an offer of proof as to each 8 one before they'll -- I'll even permit them to be called. 9 MR. INIGUEZ: Okay. 10 THE COURT: But -- there's no prohibition against 11 calling another lawyer, if it's relevant. 12 MR. WEXLER: A couple of conditions, your Honor. THE COURT: Highly frowned upon, but it's not 13 impermissible. 14 MR. WEXLER: There was, in the defendant's filing, a 15 proffer as to each witness, and the Government strongly objects 16 17 to all three, based on the proffer. First, as Mr. Iniquez stated, Agent Hill will be a 18 Government witness, to the extent that the role of the I.R.S. 19 is relevant. And, actually, Agent Hill won't be the only 20 21 I.R.S. witness of the Government's. There will be two other 22 I.R.S. employees. The defendant can cross-examine them as to the role of the I.R.S. 23 24 THE COURT: Sure. MR. WEXLER: Two, the proffer for my testimony is to 25

establish the Providence of the case and to establish that the 1 2 case is bonded. Also to testify to the issuance of certain bonds on the basis that if those bonds --3 THE COURT: I don't know what they're talking about. 4 MR. WEXLER: Exactly, your Honor. It's completely 5 irrelevant. I have no personal knowledge of any of that 6 information and --7 8 THE COURT: I'll be excluding it. 9 MR. WEXLER: And, finally, the defendant has 10 proffered that Ms. Rosenblum, Attorney General Rosenblum will 11 be called to establish whether the charged statutes are 12 constitutional and, therefore, relevant. Which, as the Government --13 14 THE COURT: Not going to happen. 15 MR. WEXLER: Yes, your Honor. 16 THE COURT: She doesn't even have to be -- respond. 17 Nor do you. 18 MR. WEXLER: Thank you, your Honor. 19 THE COURT: All right. Well --20 MR. WEXLER: And then if your Honor would like to then address the Government -- the defendant also, in addition 21 22 to the proposed video, proposed three additional exhibits. 23 the Government would note for the record that, first, the 24 defendant's proposed Exhibit No. 2 is already admitted into evidence as Government's Exhibit 11-17. That is the 25

Treasury -- the Office of International Treasury Control Certificate.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. WEXLER: Two, the defendant propose the Exhibit No. 4, which is a -- purports to be a certified record of the state of Delaware as relating to the Internal Revenue Tax and Audit Service, Incorporated, is not the I.R.S. And so that document is entirely irrelevant to this case.

And, finally, the statement made in defendant's proposed Exhibit No. 3, which is the United States's answer and claim in diversified metals.

THE COURT: Well, I don't know what in the world that is.

MR. WEXLER: Well, specifically, your Honor, I believe the defendant is referring to paragraph 4 in that document, which is a pleading by the United States in the case in which it denied the Internal Revenue Service as an agency of the United States Government. It's actually accurate, the -- the Internal Revenue Service is an agency of the Department of Treasury. And the Department of Treasury is a department of the United States Government. So to the extent that that's accurate, it's an accurate statement of law. But the function and proper role of the I.R.S. --

THE COURT: It's a stupid thing to deny.

MR. WEXLER: Yes, your Honor. Yes, your Honor.

MR. INIGUEZ: Maybe on that, Judge, if we could 1 2 stipulate as to the correct statement that Mr. Wexler just 3 made, that may be helpful, I guess. THE COURT: You make it --4 MR. WEXLER: And I believe that's actually how it's 5 phrased in the Superseding Indictment, your Honor, but I could 6 7 refer back to that. But it's generally our practice to refer 8 to the I.R.S. as an agency of the department of --9 THE COURT: You just make that statement in your 10 opening statement. 11 MR. LANGSTON: That the I.R.S. --12 MR. INIGUEZ: Department of Treasury. THE COURT: But that pleading is not going to be 13 received. None of those will be. 14 15 MR. WEXLER: So then, your Honor, the only question mark is the defendant's video, which I understand you haven't 16 17 had a chance to review. Mr. Langston has reviewed it, and we would object to it as entirely self-serving hearsay. 18 THE COURT: Well, we'll take a look at it. 19 20 It's going to be helpful to the jury to hear what this fella is saying to these audiences in London and around, 21 22 to get some context to this. 23 I appreciate that his own statements are hearsay 24 under our rule, unless they fall within one of the exceptions:

Inconsistent, recent fabrication, identification. They don't

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fall under those. But, on the other hand, this jury will want to know what is this guy saying out there. MR. INIGUEZ: And, Judge, I think, just to go to that issue, before you look at it, right, we were introducing all of these other statements from all of these other seminars. is a YouTube video that he presents to the world, as it was. And I think in order to have the completeness of his statements be known to the jury, I think it's important for this to be heard. And, again, it does go to that sincerely held belief that he has. So I think it is relevant and important for them to hear it all. MR. WEXLER: To that effect, your Honor -- I'm sorry. Did you want to --MR. LANGSTON: Yeah. And, your Honor, I should note that -- so this is not a speech that he gave at the seminars. This is an entirely separate set of talking points that he made --Where did he make them? THE COURT: MR. LANGSTON: -- on his YouTube channel. He is literally speaking to the camera in his

apartment. It doesn't speak to any of the documents contained in the 514 counts.

THE COURT: What?

MR. INIGUEZ: He kind of -- what it is -- he says,
"This is the first time I'm doing this. My first YouTube."

And he's trying to explain why he's doing it.

THE COURT: I'll look at it. It sounds awfully self-serving. The point now -- but I was hoping to have a sniglet of him -- what he's saying to a live audience in a hotel environment.

MR. WEXLER: Well, your Honor, to the extent that the Government's video -- they've all been taken at seminars and in a live environment.

THE COURT: I think that would probably do it.

MR. WEXLER: And the other thing I would say about the YouTube video is that the defendant can get on the stand and apparently will get on the stand and say all of the things that are in his video and simply say that I put up a video on YouTube saying that. The video itself is out-of-court hearsay and should not be available.

THE COURT: Well, after he testifies, we'll see if it needs any -- if it's simply cumulative, it won't happen.

MR. WEXLER: Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything else?

MR. WEXLER: Yes, your Honor. I apologize.

And these are --

THE COURT: Don't apologize. We're here to -- this is hard work, when we're dealing with a person who wants to represent themselves, who have no legal training. They are all over the block. And so counsel's got -- he's trying a case

with his arms tied together.

Anyway, go ahead.

MR. WEXLER: So, your Honor, I have -- the Government has a few points that we could either resolve today or we could resolve tomorrow.

THE COURT: Better do it right now.

MR. WEXLER: So the first is the Government intends to introduce via judicial notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, a copy of 18 USC 514 that is more complete than what is contained in the jury instruction. And, specifically, the reason why is that 18 USC 514(b) refers to definitions contained in 18 USC 513.

And a copy of 18 USC 513 was found on the defendant's computer and has been admitted as Government's Exhibit -- part of Government's Exhibit 11-8.

What the Government would like to do is to establish, one, that the defendant knew of 18 USC 514. And the Government will do that through an alert that was found on the defendant's computer specifically referencing 18 U.S.C. 514. Show

18 US 514 where it references 513. Make it clear that 514 was not on the defendant's computer but 513 was.

THE COURT: Can't you save that for your cross-examination of him?

MR. WEXLER: Yes, except the defendant could always decide that he doesn't want to --

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summary.

THE COURT: Well, I don't want to give an exhibit of what the law is. It's my job to do that via instruction. think that you can do that when he testifies. And if he denounces it, then you can make your offer. MR. WEXLER: Very well, your Honor. The second item is while --THE COURT: And there's nothing that prevents you from blowing that up, any portion of my instructions. sides can blow up and -- in your closing -- even in your opening statement, but preferably in your closing argument. MR. WEXLER: Yes, your Honor. And I do intend to do that. It's just that this particular part of 514, since it's not relevant to the jury's deliberations, is not part of your instruction. THE COURT: Well, you do it in your --MR. WEXLER: I think cross-examination will work, your Honor. THE COURT: If it doesn't, you can do it in your closing argument. MR. WEXLER: Thank you. And perhaps in my closing instructions. THE COURT: MR. WEXLER: The other two items, the Government -as you may recall, your Honor -- agreed to withdraw Government's Exhibit 11-9 and 11-10 and simply refer to them in

In going back through our evidence, however, there 1 2 are two specific documents in 11-10 that are highly relevant to other documents that have already been admitted. 3 Is that part of the summary? 4 THE COURT: MR. WEXLER: They're part of the summary, your Honor, 5 but the content is very specific. 6 7 THE COURT: Well, if they have independent relevance, 8 that's fine. The fact that he has a summary doesn't prohibit 9 you from using specifics, obviously. 10 MR. WEXLER: Yes, your Honor. 11 It's just that they are not currently admitted 12 because they were excluded as part of 11-10. 13 THE COURT: Oh, I see. MR. WEXLER: So the Government would simply suggest 14 that they be admitted as Government's Exhibits 11-20 and '21. 15 And we could either do that at the --16 17 Identify them more clearly, other than THE COURT: 18 number. 19 MR. WEXLER: Yes, your Honor. 20 They are in Exhibit 11-10, page 34, which is a template of an international bill of exchange for credit to 21 22 Metro Grant Holding. That is the same IBOE that's charged in 23 Counts 10, 11, 8, and 9. And then also 11-10, page 139, which is an IBOE 24 template to -- and someone known as Father George Abdulrahim 25

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     Mouselli.
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               THE COURT: Spell that.
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               MR. WEXLER: I would have to do it off the top of my
    head, your Honor. But I believe --
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               THE COURT: Well, that's good enough. Phonetically
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     is fine.
               MR. WEXLER:
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                            Thank you.
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               And that relates directly to an item that's been
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     admitted as Government's Exhibit 11-8, a joint venture
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     agreement that proposes the defendant make an IBOE.
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               THE COURT: When I said you didn't have to spell it,
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    but would you please do it phonetically.
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               MR. WEXLER: Oh, oh. I'm sorry, your Honor.
               THE COURT: For Amanda.
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               MR. WEXLER: It's Father George Abdulrahim Mouselli.
               Is that good?
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               THE COURT: Got it?
                                    (Nods head.)
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               THE COURT REPORTER:
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               MR. WEXLER: And so, your Honor, those two exhibits
     are what the Government would propose as 11-20 and 11-21.
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               THE COURT: Okay. There is no objection. They'll be
     received.
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               MR. WEXLER: And then the remainder are just
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    housekeeping items, your Honor.
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               The first is Kristin Ellinger, who is the revenue
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agent in the Government's case, as noticed in our trial brief 1 and I believe in our witness summary. 2 Ms. Emminger will be testifying last because she is 3 testifying to certain tax implications of the defendant's 4 conduct, and she must take into account the entirety of the 5 admitted testimony when doing that. 6 7 THE COURT: Fine. 8 MR. WEXLER: Draft schedules have already been 9 provided to the defendant. But before Ms. Emminger testifies, 10 the Government would ask that we take a break, so that 11 Ms. Emminger can actually finalize --12 THE COURT: Just alert me when that happens. 13 MR. WEXLER: Yes, your Honor. The other item -- well, a second item is that, as the 14 15 Government has informed and the Court has seen, Ms. Becker, the Government's --16 17 THE COURT: Yeah. MR. WEXLER: -- witness, is not in good health and 18 19 cannot sustain remaining in court --20 THE COURT: Do you really need her? MR. WEXLER: Yes, your Honor. Absent a stipulation 21 22 to the deposition --23 THE COURT: Well, it would appear that she's not in 24 good health, and this would be former testimony? 25 MR. WEXLER: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Subject to -- prior testimony under oath, 1 2 subject to examination? 3 MR. WEXLER: Yes, your Honor. THE COURT: It will be admitted on that basis. 4 She doesn't need to appear. 5 MR. WEXLER: So to that extent, your Honor, would the 6 7 Court allow the Government to play the video of her testimony 8 for the Court? 9 THE COURT: Either way. 10 MR. WEXLER: Okay. 11 MR. INIGUEZ: Judge, Mr. Shrout would -- when he was 12 here the other day, he did object to that. My understanding -- you know, there's this 13 relationship among these folks. Right? The gal that you 14 allowed to stay in the courtroom, Ms. Bekken, Patricia, is 15 really good friends with Ms. Becker. And so in speaking with 16 17 Ms. Becker, she understands that actually right now Ms. Becker is doing better than she was back when we did the deposition. 18 19 I understand that she would prefer not to come to 20 Court, but she is certainly local. She's certainly in good enough health where she could appear. I don't think she meets 21 22 the standards for an unavailable witness. 23 THE COURT: Do you want her here in person? 24 MR. INIGUEZ: Mr. Shrout does want her here in 25 person.

MR. WEXLER: And the Government is fine with that, 1 your Honor, and generally would agree. We have not met with 2 3 Ms. Becker since she testified --THE COURT: Does -- she has a medical -- documented 4 medical disability, of course, and it's unrebutted? 5 We will go with her testimony under 804. But, 6 7 otherwise, she'll -- if she has to go to the bathroom, we have 8 a facility within steps. 9 MR. WEXLER: Yes. 10 THE COURT: Your call. 11 MR. WEXLER: Yes, your Honor. 12 And the reason I --THE COURT: I mean, it's my call, but I'll adhere to 13 14 the information that I get. 15 MR. WEXLER: Thank you, your Honor. And the reason I bring it up is simply that the 16 17 Government intends for Ms. Becker to be our fifth witness, and it will mark the transition in the Government's case from the 18 514 statutes to the 7203 statutes. 19 20 THE COURT: Perfect. MR. WEXLER: We believe there is a possibility that 21 22 we could get to Ms. Becker's testimony late in the day on 23 Tuesday, however -- which is tomorrow. 24 I doubt it. I doubt it. THE COURT: 25 MR. WEXLER: Well, the Government has instructed

Ms. Becker, because of her health, to just show up Wednesday 1 morning. 2 THE COURT: Perfect. 3 MR. WEXLER: And the Government would simply ask that 4 if we get to Ms. Becker's testimony, that the Court adjourn for 5 the day and take up the next morning. The Government will only 6 7 have about two hours total. 8 THE COURT: As long as we get through before next 9 week. I've got a commitment for the following Monday. 10 But everything's moving much faster. 11 MR. WEXLER: Thank you, your Honor. 12 THE COURT: So on that score, do you think we'll be through with your case by Wednesday? 13 14 MR. WEXLER: Yes, your Honor. I anticipate, based on our witness prep -- of course, 15 we don't know the extent of cross-examination. But we do 16 17 believe that we will --MR. INIGUEZ: Neither do I. 18 MR. WEXLER: But we do believe that we will be 19 20 closing our case-in-chief sometime Wednesday, possibly 21 Wednesday morning. 22 THE COURT: And how long the defense will take is how 23 long it will take. 24 MR. INIGUEZ: Well, your Honor, given the anticipated rulings on his other witnesses, it shouldn't be -- should not 25

take very long.

Of course, the Government is suggesting that rather than do things like a 20-minute video that he be allowed to present that. It may take -- may take longer, but I can't imagine it's going to be --

THE COURT: Fine.

MR. INIGUEZ: -- past Thursday.

THE COURT: Perfect.

MR. WEXLER: Thank you, your Honor.

And then, finally, the Court docket says that the proceeding will begin tomorrow at 9:00 a.m. Just wanted to confirm that time and also confirm the Court's expected daily calendar, when --

THE COURT: Okay. I -- I -- as I told you, I go down and excuse the jurors who can't serve.

We have 35 jurors coming in. We've got ten

peremptories for the defense and six for the Government, and I

hope you don't use anywhere near that number. And -- because

I -- but I think I can tell the jury safely that this case will

be complete -- completed no later than Friday. And that if we

finish earlier, they'll be happier.

But my hours are 9:00 a.m., morning. Break at noon. Pick up at 1:15 to 1:30. And go until 4:30.

MS. BECKERMAN: We have an 11:30 one day. We have 11:30 hearings on one day.

Yeah. Well, they'll be fast. THE COURT: 1 2 THE CLERK: Yeah. But, I mean, we'll be breaking. Just so they'll know we'll be breaking early that day. 3 MR. WEXLER: What day is that? 4 I have that list right here for him. 5 THE CLERK: The 9:30s are on the 19th. 6 7 MR. WEXLER: The 11:30s? 8 THE CLERK: The 11:30s, I mean. Yeah. We have two 9 on the 19th. Um-hmm. 10 THE COURT: Okay. Well, you have all done a great 11 job to narrow these issues down, and we'll take it from there. 12 MR. WEXLER: Thank you, your Honor. 13 THE COURT: Anything else? MR. LANGSTON: Not from the people -- or not from the 14 15 Government. MR. INIGUEZ: You had asked at the beginning, Judge, 16 17 about their witnesses. I don't see any problem with those nine 18 witnesses. 19 THE COURT: Thank you. 20 MR. LANGSTON: Was there an issue with the defense closing? 21 22 MR. INIGUEZ: Oh, I wanted to raise the issue of the defense closing and the possibility that Mr. Shrout be allowed 23 24 to do the majority of that but I be allowed to do a brief closing as well. 25

36 THE COURT: It would be welcome. 1 2 MR. INIGUEZ: Thank you. THE COURT: Anything else for the good of the order? 3 MR. INIGUEZ: No, Judge, not for the defense. 4 MR. LANGSTON: No, your Honor. 5 THE COURT: Off the record. 6 7 (Conclusion of proceedings.) 8 9 --000--10 11 I certify, by signing below, that the foregoing is a correct 12 stenographic transcript of the oral proceedings had in the above-entitled matter this 8th day of May, 2017. A transcript 13 without an original signature or conformed signature is not 14 certified. I further certify that the transcript fees and 15 format comply with those prescribed by the Court and the 16 17 Judicial Conference of the United States. 18 /S/ Amanda M. LeGore 19 20 AMANDA M. LeGORE, CSR, RDR, CRR, FCRR, CE CSR No. 15-0433 EXP: 3-31-2018 21 22 23 24